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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CALINOIS LAND COMP ANY,
a limited partnership consisting of
HOBERT E. OVERTREE and
DAVID T. SHIFFMAN,
. t z'ffs- A ppe ll an t s,
·general partners, J:>[ azn
vs.
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defcndant-Respondent,

Case No.
12962

vs .
.JOHN \V. CUNNINGHAM,
lnterpleader-Respondent.

Reply Brief of Security Title Company

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a second proceeding by Calinois against
Security Title Company respecting the same lots in
Evergreen Park Subdivision No. 1 in Weber County.
The first case embraced these and other lots and was
1

resolved by mutual full releases and dismissal with
prejudice in Civil No. 184745.
DISPOSITION OF LO\VER COURT
Honorable Bryant H. Croft at pre-trial conference,
after considering the pleadings in this case, the file in
Civil No. 1847 45 and the representations and arguments
of counsel, dismissed the Complaint on the basis of
res adjudicata as to the 53 lots involved.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The Plaintiff, Calinois, seeks reversal of Judge
Croft's decision; and Defendant-Respondent, Security
Title Company, seeks affirmation of that decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Though the basic facts are set forth by Judge
Croft in his Memorandum Decision at pages 2-7 inclusive (R 102-107), we believe that other salient factual
items must be identified to aid this Court in its full
understanding of the issues.
The underlying facts are found in the copies of
agreements attached to the plaintiff's Complaint
(R 4-18) and the Objections to Dismiss (R 46-61),
and there are no material facts in dispute between the
parties that would require independent testimony. The
53 lots here involved are in Evergreen Park Subdivi2

sion No. 1 in \,Y eber County and are part of a larger
tract consisting of some 563 lots conveyed to Security
Title Company as Trustee under a Trust Agreement,
( R 4) dated November 15, HHW, in which plaintiff
Calinois, appears as a first beneficiary, and John '"·
Cunningham appears as second beneficiary. Secmity
Title was to hold said lots pending payment of certain
sums by Cunningham to Calinois ($158,430.62). Cunningham then entered into an Exchange Agreement
in 1968 with Dumont Corporation whereby 500 of the
said lots were to be exchanged for 62,500 shares of
Class A common stock of Dumont (then value of
$500,000.)

Thereat' ter the litigation involved in Civil No. 184,7 45 developed, wherein Calinois alleged that Cunningham had failed to make the payments required of him
to Calinois and demand was made for reconveyance
of all of the lots to Calinois by Security Title. Dumont
was made a party to said proceeding, and after rather
extensive proceedings the matter was resolved by a
"Settlement Agreement and General Release" (R
46-52) wherein they agreed to a settlement of all claims
between all of the parties and dismissal of the law
suit with prejudice. This document specifically provided for the conveyance by warranty deed of 500 lots
to Dumont and Calinois was to receive certain cash,
stock and a trust deed and note for $82,500.00. In
paragraph 1, in consideration of this settlement and
the receipt of valuable consideration, "Calinois, for
itself and all persons claiming under it, hereby jointly
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and severally releases, acquits and forever discharges
Dumont, Security and Cunningham . . . " (R 47).
Calinois received the 20,625 shares of stock, the note
and the trust deed, and 500 lots were then conveyed by
Security Title to Dumont and the residual number of
lots, being 53, were, on demand, then conveyed to
Cunningham's nominee. Security Title then had discharged its duties and responsibilities under the Trust
and the compromise settlement.
The entry into the stipulation "that judgment may
be entered" ( R 46) and the subsequent dismissal of
the action with prejudice are fully admitted by the
plaintiff in its Answers to Interrogatories and by the
files and records of the case and at page 6 of its brief.
Subsequently Calinois observed that 53 lots had
gone to Mr. Cunningham's nominee, made demand upon
Security Title, and was informed that Security Title
had conveyed the lots and had nothing further it could
convey, and then this proceeding was filed. We see
nothing in the appellants' Brief that indicates that there
are facts different from those set forth in the Memorandum by Judge Croft, or from which different conclusions could have been drawn.
The deposition of Herbert H. Halliday, escrow
officer for Security Title, was taken. He handled the
escrow, prepared the conveyances and was familiar
with the entire matter. At page 8 he pointed out that
Dumont was paying Cunningham 62,500 shares of its
Class A stock for the 500 lots and from that amount
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of stock Calinois was "to receive 20,625 share~" for its
beneficial interest in the trust. At that time, page 6,
Calinois, Cunnningham and Dumont all asserted some
interest in the lots being held by Security Title. "They
didn't all claim an interest in all parts that we had.
Some parts were in dispute." He was then asked about
the compromise settlement of the dispute and Civil No.
184,745, and he testified at page 24 " . . . it was our
interpretation that you had settled completely every
interest that you had in this matter."
No counter-affidavits have been filed by Calinois
in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL FACTS WERE BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT AT PRE-TRIAL AND NO FACTS EXIST UPON WHICH REASONABLE MEN
MAY DRAW DIFFERING CONCLUSIONS.
The determination by Judge Croft was at pre-trial
rather than on a direct motion for summary judgment,
but it is akin to it, and the rules for the same are set
forth in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The basic language of the rule is that such may
be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." This was the status
and determination by Judge Croft.
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We know of no material fact that is at issue between
the parties. All of the contracts are stipulated to and
admitted and the proceedings in Civil No. 1847 45 were
before the court, wherein the case was dismissed upon
stipulation of Calinois with prejudice as to Security
Title. The mutual release is a part of the record and
plaintiff has not, by affidavit, pleading or otherwise,
asserted any new or different facts other than those
clearly set forth in the Memorandum Decision of Judge
Croft. As stated in Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123
Utah 289, 259 P. 2d 297, 298, the party against whom
the summary judgment is granted is entitled to the
benefit of having the court consider all of the facts
presented. This has been done by Judge Croft in this
case.
A number of cases have considered the impact of
Rule 56, providing for summary judgment, in both
tort cases and in contract cases. In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 292 ( 431 P. 2d, 126-128, you said:
Summary judgments are more frequently given
on contract cases because of the greater ease in
determining the factual issues.
Such is surely the situation in the present litigation.
The contracts are clear and unambiguous and not
requiring interpretation by external, oral evidence, and
hence can be read and construed with ease by the court,
and were so construed by the trial judge in this matter.
The year 1972 has had a number of cases involving
summary judgment, one of which involved somewhat
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similar issues, where an attempt was being made to
rehtigate the same issues that had been previously
decided by the District Court. In Orton v. Adams
(June 22, 1972) 498 P. 2d 654, the defendant's motion
for summary judgment was granted, determining that
tile lands involved were not subject to a prior judgment
lien and that said issue had been previously considered
and decided by the court-'"Hence there is no issue of
fact to resolve." In August of 1972 Wingefs Incorporated v. Bitters was decided, 500 P. 2d, 1007. Summary
judgment had been granted by the District Court but
the same was reversed and a plenery trial was ordered.
Some foundational rules were stated, and the first was,
The primary one is that if the language of the
contract is such that the intention of the parties is
clearly and unequivocally expressed, it must be
enforced according to its terms.
Citations affirm that position and we feel that there
will be no dispute raised in this case on that issue.
In the decision it then appeared that there were
issues that were to be raised beyond those stated in the
contracts, and because a forfeiture was involved, and
interpretations could be had which would avoid that,
the court said that it would not follow a strict construction contended for by the plaintiff, which was "unduly
harsh and oppressive upon the buyers", but rather when
there is a choice, an interpretation which will bring
about an equitable result will be preferred over a harsh
or inequitable one. Then on the issue of summary judg-
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ment it was stated again that such should be granted
"only when it clearly appears that there is no issue
of fact in dispute which if resolved in favor of the loser
would entitle them to prevail."
In our present case there is no equitable or unjust
result, as Calinois (the plaintiff iu this present case)
received 20,625 shares of Dumont stock, which was at
one time worth $500,000.00, plus a note and trust deed
on the 500 lots in the subdivision for $82,500.00. No
issues of fact have been claimed or asserted which need
adjudication, and no harsh or inequitable result has
developed as a result of the granting of the summary
judgment in the present case.

POINT II
CALINOIS
WAS
WELL ACQUAINTED
WITH THE LOTS INVOLVED AND RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL AND VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION.
POINT III
NO DEMAND HAD BEEN MADE BY CALlNOIS FOR CONVEYANCE OF 53 LOTS.
POINT IV
THE AGREEMENTS, MUTUAL RELEASES
AND PRIOR ORDERS ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND NOT SUBJECT TO VARIANCE BY ORAL TESTIMONY.
8

Calinois did not in any place contend that it did
not receive full consideration for the compromise settlement effected in the prior litigation, Civil No. 184,7 45.
As pointed out in the .Memorandum Decision of Judge
Croft ( R 102) , the 20,625 shares of Class A stock of
Dumont which were received by Calinois were as of
November 15, rn6G valued at $163,000.00. It is recognized that subsequently the market for the same declined
substantially, but the same shares were still available
and were delivered. In addition it received a trust deed
and note for $82,500.00 secured by the 500 lots in Evergreen Park Subdivision No. 1. These are to be weighed
against the original contract for the sale of the entire
563 lots, as shown in the Trust Agreement (R 4-13)
for a total consideration of $158,430.62.
Calinois has been the owner of these lots, was fully
acquainted with the number, identity and characteristics
of the lots, and after the extensive litigation elected,
of its own free will, to accept by way of compromise
settlement the 20,625 Dumont shares and the $82,500.00
note and to satisfy, discharge and dismiss all of its
claims against Security Title. It is_ of no consequence
to Calinois that Dumont, which was paying the 62,500
shares of stock and the $82,500.00 trust deed and note,
claimed and required only 500 lots. This did leave a
residue to 53 lots for Mr. Cunningham, who had organized the entire tranaction, been the primary obligor
in the November 15, 1966 Trust Agreement and had
entered into the transaction for a profit, the same as
all other parties had. The mere fact that he could nego-
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tiate successfully from Dumont, his vendee, sufficient
consideration for 500 lots that would satisfy and discharge the obligations which Calinois expected to be
paid by transfer of 20,625 shares of DlUilont stock and
the trust deed for the $82,500.00, is of no consequence
to Calinois. Calinois, Dumont, Cunningham and Security Title were all parties to the compromise settlement
( R 46-52) . No inequities exist in this tranaction, as
Calinois sold the land, consisting of the numerous lots
that they had, and received valuable consideration for
the same. Now Calinois not only wants to receive and
retain the valuable consideration which it had as a result
of the Settlement Agreement and General Release
dated October 9, 1969, but asserts that it has somehow
forfeited out the claims and interests of John W. Cunningham, and is now entitled to the return to it of the
53 lots now in litigation.
On this last element it is to be observed that in the
Trust Agreement, paragraph X (R 8) such a forfeiture and return of the lots to Calinois can only occur
in the event of default by Cunningham in the obligations involved. This requires notice to Security Title of
such a default by Cunningham. There is no allegation
in the record to show that any default occurred after
the Settlement Agreement and General Release between the parties in October of 1969, in which Calinois
"releases, acquits and forever discharges Dlllllont, Se·
curity and Cunningham . . . from any and all obligations, claim, debts, demands, covenants, contracts,
promises, agreements, liabilities, controversies, costs,
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expenses, attorneys' fees, actions or causes of action
whatsoever, whether known or unknown.' No default
could occur in the contract after that date, as Calinois
had received the full and valuable consideration for its
sale of the lots and no basis remained for claiming a
default or forfeiture against Cunningham, and hence
no right to require Security Title to convey to Calinois
then existed.
This demand for the 53 lots is merely an afterthought dreamed up by someone who had somehow
forgotten that a full and complete settlement had been
accomplished between the parties. There was no consideration yet to be paid to Calinois and hence no basis
for forfeiture. Security is a mere stake-holder in this
matter. After the General Release and Settlement, it
conveyed these 53 lots to Cunningham, as it was obligated to do, as the obligations, debts and undertakings
set forth in the Trust Agreement had been fully satisfied and discharged, insofar as Cunningham's duty of
payment of consideration to Calinois was concerned.
Seldom have we seen a circumstance where the
contracts between the parties are so clear and unambiguous, and where there is no room for the variance
by interpretation of the same by some outside parol
evidence, as would be necessary if any testimony were
to be taken in this particular case. At every step of the
proceedings all parties were represented by legal counsel. Particularly in Civil No. 184, 7 45, the Settlement
Agreement and General Release is in short, clear,
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concise and unambiguous terms, leaving no question
whatsoever but that it was the intention of all parties
to make a mutual, final settlement and general release
of the issues. Thereafter, by legal counsel, a stipulation
for dismissal of the case with prejudice was filed with
the court and the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice was
then entered.
Calinois in said Civil No. 184, 7 45, had filed its law
suit in the District Court of Salt Lake County to gain
possession from Security Title of all of the then remaining lots covered by the original Trust Agreement of
1966. It is. true that at that time the number of lots
involved was 563, rather than 500 lots. Calinois should
have known that fact, as it is the one who sold the lots
in the first place. However, in the Settlement Agreement and General Release ( R 48) 500 lots were clearly
identified in paragraph 5, and copies of the Deed of
Trust describing said 500 lots are attached thereto
(R 59).
Plaintiff's' Brief talks about the letters in N ovember of 1968, but all of such matters were merely preliminary negotiations and were merged and resolved
by the Settlement Agreement and General Release on
October 9, 1969, and the ensuing dismissal with prejudice of Civil No. 184,745. No reservations of lots or
rights by Calinois were contained in the settlement.
Whether the dispute arose from the alleged def ault
in the original Trust Agreement in 1966, from the issues
raised by the 1968 Exchange Agreement (R 53-55)
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or the problems which arose when trading in Dumont
stock was suspended, or otherwise, all matters were
resolved in the October 1969 Settlement Agreement.
No new or subsequent contracts or undertakings are
alleged by plaintiffs.
The final position of plaintiffs in this appeal is
that the Exchange was the sole premise for the settlement and plaintiffs did not intend to release all rights
in and to the lots, (pages 8 and 9 of brief). Such is
not a valid contention. The Exchange Agreement is
attached to the Settlement Agreement, as is the Warranty Deed from Security Title to Dumont on the
500 lots. So too is the Note and Deed of Trust for
the $82,500.00. All of these were entangled in Civil
No. 184,7 45 and the issues therein stated. Nevertheless,
the settlement is complete and all inclusive and the
dismissal of the case was "with prejudice." No reservations of rights or lots is anywhere to be found.
POINT V
THE COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT OF
CIVIL NO. 184,745 COUPLED WITH THE
MUTUAL RELEASES AND THE NON-APPEALED DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE,
CONSTITUTES RES ADJUDICATA OF THE
SAME ISSUES.
POINT VI
THE SAME LOTS WERE INVOLVED IN
BOTH PROCEEDINGS. REPETITIVE AD-
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JUDICATlON IS CONTRARY
JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES.

TO SOUND

This case seems to be a classic example of res
adjudicata in that the same parties were in the same
respective positions and the same lots were the subject
of the litigation. Calinois was the plaintiff in the initial
litigation in Civil No. 184, 7 45 entitled "Calinois Land
Company, et al., v. Security Title Company, et al."
It is true that in the prior case some 553 lots were
involved, whereas in this case only 53 of the same lots
are involved. The same Trust Agreement dated November 15, 1966 was the subject matter of the prior
litigation. The basic issue there presented was the contention of Calinois that Cunningham had defaulted in
the payment of his obligations under the Trust Agreement, and hence Calinois was entitled to have Security
Title reconvey the property to it. Such are the identical
issues here involved, except there is no allegation of
defa ult, in that the only claim and basis upon which
the plaintiff can demand a reconveyance of the lots
remaining, 53 in number, to Calinois, would be that
Cunningham had defaulted in the performance of the
terms and provisions of the Trust Agreement.
Now the parties have resolved these differences by
the Settlement Agreement and General Release and
by the subsequent Stipulation for Dismissal of the action
with prejudice. This stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice was agreed to by counsel for Calinois,. the
same counsel involved in this litigation, and also stipu·
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lated to by counsel for Security Title, the same counsel
as here involved.
The Court has had occasion from time to time to
consider the plea of res adjudicata, and one of the more
recent decisions along this line is Richards v. Hodson,
26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P. 2d 1044. This was an action
by real estate brokers to recover a commission.At page
1046 the following quotes set forth the general philosophy of res adjudicata and then the application here,
in which the principal doctrine is also identified as
"collateral estoppel."
Strictly speaking, the term "res judicata" applies to a judgment between the same parties who
in a prior action litigated the identical questions
which are present in the later case. Not only are
the parties bound by the ruling on matters actually litigated, but they are also prevented from
raising issues which should have been raised in the
former action. The rule of law is wise in that it
gives finality to judgments and also conserves the
time of courts, in that courts should not be required to relitigate matters which have once been
fully and finally determined .
. . . The defendants here were parties to the
prior action and litigated fully their claim that
there was no contract of sale. They have had their
day in court. They have tried that issue fully and
now attempt to retry it.
A form of res judicata applies to situations .like
this wherein issues which are actually decided
against a party in a prior action may be relied
upon by an opponent in a lat~r case. as having
been judicially established. This doctrme, known

15

as collat~ral estoppel, differs from res judicata
not o~ly m the fact that all parties need not be the
same m the two actions, but also in the fact that
the stoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and not to those which could have been determined. The trend of recent cases is to approve
this doctrine.
We think the trial judge correctly held that the
validity of the sale had already been established
and that no proof needed to be given on that point
in the trial of the instant matter.
We have in our present case the circumstance
where Calinois was the plaintiff in the first case, and the
stipulation was made and the order entered of dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. Hence such
was a judgment wherein the issues are actually decided
upon the merits against a party in a prior action. Such
can be and is relied upon by Security Title as the same
opponent in the first case and in this second case. All
issues have been judicially established in that cause
of action and as stated in the Settlement Agreement
and General Release ( R 47) . We reassert that no
error was committed by Judge Croft in his determination that,
Accordingly, I find, as a matter of law, that the
issues raised in the case at bar with respect to
those 53 lots were resolved in the settlement in
184 7 45 and that Calinois, as plaintiff in case No.
193:327: is not now entitled to relitigate those issues in the new law suit. It is, therefore, ordered
that the complaint of Calinois against Security
Title and Cunningham, as an interpleader ~e
f endant, be and the same is hereby dismissed with
prejudice. (R. 108).
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WHEREFORE, defendant-respondent, Security
Title Company, urges the court to affirm the determination of Judge Croft and to deny the relief sought
by the plaintiff-appellants in this proceeding.
Dated this 19th day of December, 1972.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
Of PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS,
CAMPBELL & COWLEY
400 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Security Title Company

17

